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This paper examines stability of international climate agreements for carbon abatement 
under an optimal transfer rule and renegotiations. The optimal transfer rule suggested to 
stabilise international environmental agreements (Weikard 2005, Carraro, Eyckmans 
and Finus 2006) is no longer optimal when agreements are renegotiated. We determine 
the conditions for optimal self-enforcing sequences of agreements. If these conditions 
are met, then transfer payments can be arranged such that no country wants to change its 
membership status at any stage. In order to demonstrate the applicability of our 
condition we use the STACO model, a 12-regions global model, to assess the impact of 
welldesigned transfer rules on the stability of an international climate agreement. 
Although there are strong free-rider incentives, we find a stable grand coalition in the 
first commitment period in a game with one round of renegotiations. 
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1 Introduction 
Efficient management of the global commons such as stability of climatic conditions and the 
conservation of biodiversity requires a grand coalition of the nation states responsible for 
environmental regulation and legislation. However, the grand coalition will generally not be 
stable as individual countries have an incentive to take a free-rider position in the provision of 
such global environmental goods. This paper examines the options to establish a stable 
international climate agreement (ICA) that comes as close as possible to the first best – but 
generally unstable – grand coalition. The notion of stability we employ is crucial. We use the 
concept of internal and external stability. A coalition is said to be stable if and only if no 
coalition member has an incentive to leave (internal stability) and no non-member has an 
incentive to join (external stability); cf. d’Aspremont et al. (1983). This notion of stability is 
applicable when the membership decision is taken only once (and for all). As we will relax 
this assumption and allow for renegotiations, we will introduce an appropriate refinement of 
the stability concept in Section 2 below. 
There exists by now an extensive literature on the stability of international environmental 
agreements. Here we focus on games where a single agreement is proposed that can be signed 
or not. This class of games is usually called cartel games with open membership. Different 
solution concepts have been employed to analyse this type of game. Hoel (1992) considers a 
‘constrained social optimum’ where social net benefits from greenhouse gas (GHG) 
abatement are maximised subject to an individual rationality constraint that requires that 
coalition members gain compared to the non-cooperative equilibrium. Eyckmans (1999) 
examines coalition stability for uniform abatement efforts using a similar individual 
rationality constraint. Individual rationality is also a condition of the core solutions considered 
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by e.g. Chander and Tulkens (1995). It is implicitly assumed that a coalition would completely 
dissolve if a coalition member leaves. By contrast the notion of (internal and external) 
stability implicitly assumes that the remaining coalition stays intact if a coalition member 
leaves. Only single deviations are considered. One might call this the pessimistic view where 
deviations occur whenever they are immediately profitable. Solution concepts relying on 
individual rationality are more optimistic in the sense that players are assumed to always stick 
to a coalition if their coalition payoff exceeds their non-cooperative payoff. In this paper we 
take a pessimistic – or cautious – view. 
We explore the stability of international climate agreements. Each player (countries or 
regions) chooses whether or not to sign the agreement and become a member of a unique 
coalition (the climate agreement). Then the coalition and the remaining singletons fix their 
abatement levels playing a Nash-Cournot game. As abatement is a pure public good, the 
equilibrium of the abatement game is generally inefficient. Only the coalition of all, the grand 
coalition, would overcome the inefficiency. The literature on cartel membership games has 
emphasised, however, that large coalitions, including the grand coalition, are only stable if 
gains from cooperation are small, that is, whenever coalition formation is rather unimportant. 
If gains from cooperation are large, the analysis of cartel games shows that only small 
coalitions that achieve relatively little are stable (e.g. Barrett 1994, Finus and Rundshagen 
2003). These results have been obtained for models with identical players and do not 
generalise when players differ (see Weikard 2005). Our results in this paper are also in 
contrast to these earlier findings. We show that there are options to stabilise successful ICAs. 
There are three main drivers of our result. 
First, we consider asymmetric countries. With asymmetric countries, in particular when 
countries differ in abatement cost, a coalition can exploit cheap abatement options if a low 
cost country joins the coalition. Low cost countries are attractive as coalition partners.  
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Second, we consider transfers between coalition members. Transfers or, more precisely, the 
sharing of the coalition payoff among members can be used to set incentives for low cost 
countries to join the coalition. In the debate on climate change policies a number of different 
sharing rules for international climate agreements have been suggested; see Rose et al. (1998). 
Only few studies have addressed the impacts of different sharing rules on the stability of 
international climate agreements. Bosello et al. (2003) consider sharing rules for abatement 
costs, Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus (2006) consider sharing rules for tradable emission 
permits and Weikard, Finus and Altamirano-Cabrera (2006) consider sharing rules for the 
gains from cooperation. The differences are crucial. If sharing rules are applied to costs or 
permits, there is no guarantee that payoffs satisfy the individual rationality constraint. By 
contrast, if sharing is applied to the gains from cooperation, individual rationality is always 
satisfied as long as a coalition is at all profitable, i.e. it achieves at least the sum of what its 
members can achieve without cooperation. Recently a class of sharing rules has been 
proposed that divides the difference between the coalition payoff and the sum of the outside 
option payoffs of coalition members (Eyckmans and Finus 2004, Fuentes-Albero and Rubio 
2005, Weikard 2005, Carraro et al. 2006, McGinty 2007). The outside option payoff is the 
payoff a player would receive when leaving the coalition. It is obvious that the internal 
stability condition can only be met when the coalition payoff exceeds the sum of the outside 
option payoffs. On the other hand, if the coalition payoff exceeds the sum of the outside 
option payoffs, then well-designed transfers can guarantee internal stability. Here we adopt an 
adjusted “optimal sharing rule” designed for a setting with renegotiations.  
Third, we allow for renegotiations of the agreement. Renegotiations improve the incentives to 
join a coalition. Players may be forced to cooperate at the first stage if there is a credible threat 
of punishment at the second stage. Moreover the second stage payoffs can be used to reward 
members of the first stage agreement. Similar to our approach Ulph (2004) and Rubio and 
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Ulph (2007) have studied renegotiations of international environmental agreements and 
dynamic membership. However, their approach is confined to symmetric countries and does 
not capture abatement cost differences and the impact of transfers to stabilise agreements. 
To study the effects of optimally designed sharing rules in an empirical setting and to illustrate 
their impacts we examine the stability of ICAs. We do this using the STACO model 
introduced by Finus et al. (2006) and refined by Nagashima et al. (2006). STACO is a global 
model comprising 12-regions for each of which abatement cost and benefit functions are 
defined. The numerical analysis in this paper extends the work of Weikard, Finus and 
Altamirano-Cabrera (2006) who consider results from the STACO model and compare 
proportional sharing of gains from cooperation according to past emissions, regional income, 
population and other indicators. They find that an emission-based proportional sharing rule 
performs best in the sense that it stabilises a coalition that gives higher global net benefits and 
lower stocks of carbon pollution than any other of the examined rules. However, as only a 
limited set of rules was examined in that study, it remained an open question whether 
coalitions can be stabilised that perform even better. Our analysis in this paper shows that an 
optimal transfer rule gives significantly better results. If we do not consider renegotiations, we 
find that there exist stable coalitions of up to 6 out of 12 regions. The best performing stable 
coalition comprises 5 regions and achieves about 46% of the gains the Grand Coalition could 
achieve as compared to non-cooperation. With renegotiations, considering two commitment 
periods, we even find a stable grand coalition in the first commitment period of 10 or 20 
years, followed by a 5 regions coalition for the second commitment period. These agreements 
achieve 59% of the potential gains over a century.  
The paper is organised as follows. The next section introduces optimal sharing rules for a 
multi-period setting. Section 3 provides a brief overview of empirical specifications of the 
STACO model for our case of ICAs. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes. 
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2 Optimal sharing in Pareto perfect coalitions 
We consider an open membership cartel formation game with renegotiations. That is, we 
consider several but finitely many periods (commitment periods) in each of which a single 
coalition or cartel (the ICA) can form. In each period 1,...,t T=  individual countries i N∈  
decide to join or not to join the agreement. Payoffs that accrue in period t depend on the 
coalition formed in that period tK N⊆ . Payoffs are determined from costs and benefits of 
equilibrium abatement of GHGs in an abatement game that is specified in the next section. 
Here it is sufficient to note that GHG abatement is a public good. It is well known for public 
goods games that the grand coalition K N=  is efficient, while any partial agreement with 
K N⊂  is not (e.g. Dasgupta 1982). In a public goods game a singleton coalition { }K i=  will 
not be effective and give the same payoffs as K = ∅ . We will refer to both cases as ‘all-
singletons’. To be more precise about payoffs, the abatement game in period t invokes a 
partition function ( )t tV K  that determines payoffs tKV  for the coalition and for each singleton 
player ( )t tjV K , tj K∉  in period t. Before we can introduce our notion of stability (of a 
sequence of coalitions) we need to define individual payoffs for coalition members. We 
assume that some sharing rule r applies that distributes the coalition payoff ( )KV K among 
members.1 Thus we arrive at a per-member partition function, also called a valuation function. 
For convenience we denote it by ( )rV K  and individual payoffs under coalition K when 
sharing rule r applies are denoted by ( )riV K . Of course, for every sharing rule r we have 
( ) ( )rK i
i K
V K V K
∈
=∑ .  We adopt the shorthand notation iK−  for \{ }K i  with i K∈  and jK+  for 
{ }K j∪  with j K∉ . Define the coalition surplus ( ) ( )K K i i
i K
S V K V K
−
∈
≡ −∑ . We call  ( )i iV K−  
                                                 
1
 We skip the time-superscript where it is not essential. 
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i’s outside option payoff or defection payoff. Note that it is, of course, independent of the 
sharing rule applied by coalition iK− . 
 Now consider the final period T and consider the following class of sharing rules for coalition 
TK :  
Each coalition member Ti K∈  receives  
( ) ( )T r T T Ti i i iV K V K s−= +  for all Ti K∈ ,      (1) 
with T
T
i K
i K
s S
∈
=∑  and 
for all Ti K∈ , 0 if and only if 0Ti Ks S≥ ≥ .  
By construction, sharing according to (1) – optimal sharing – gives each coalition member at 
least its outside option payoff if this is feasible, i.e. if 0TKS ≥ . Hence, optimal sharing gives 
priority to setting incentives to join the agreement. Weikard (2005) shows that every coalition 
that is internally stable under some arbitrary sharing rule will also be internally stable under 
the family of sharing rules characterised by (1). The underlying standard notion of stability is 
as follows (d’Aspremont et al. 1983): 
DEFINITION 1  A coalition K  is stable under sharing rule r, if it is  
(i) internally stable, i.e.  
 ( ) ( )ri i iV K V K−≥  for all i K∈ ,  
and 
(ii) externally stable, i.e.  
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 ( ) ( )rj j jV K V K+>  for all \j N K∈ .2  
In a setting with renegotiations, the notion of stability of Definition 1 has to be refined. First, 
strictly speaking, the object of stability is no longer a coalition under a sharing rule r, but 
rather sequence of coalitions coupled with sharing rules 
1 1
,...,
T
r r TK K . We adopt the 
terminology that coalition r tK  is generalised stable under sharing rule r if no member wants 
to leave and no non-member wants to join. It is important to note that generalised stability of a 
coalition in a given period may depend on the coalitions formed and the sharing rules applied 
in other periods and therefore Definition 1 does not apply but needs refinement. 
The coalition formation game we study is a finite sequential game and the equilibrium concept 
employed is renegotiation proof equilibrium introduced by Farrell and Maskin (1989).3 This 
equilibrium concept is a refinement of Selten’s (1965, 1975) subgame perfect equilibrium that 
rules out the play of a Pareto dominated subgames in an equilibrium path of play. In the 
following we will refer to it as Pareto perfect equilibrium.    
Before formally defining Pareto perfect sequences of coalitions, we need to introduce some 
further notation and a definition of generalised stability. 
Denote by w TiKɶ  the stable coalition with sharing rule w that gives the worst payoff of all stable 
coalitions to player i in period T, that is  ( ) ( )T w T T r Ti i iV K V K≤ɶ  for all stable r TK . 
We can now recursively define generalised stability. A definition of Pareto perfect equilibrium 
follows. 
                                                 
2
 The tie-breaking rule is here that a player would join the coalition if she is indifferent between joining and 
staying out. Hence, by this definition, the empty set ∅  is not externally stable, and a trivial coalition is 
internally stable. 
3
  See also Bernheim and Ray (1989). A related but stronger equilibrium concept is Bernheim, Peleg and 
Whinston’s (1987) coalition-proof equilibrium.   
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DEFINITION 2  (i) In the last period a coalition TK  is generalised stable under sharing 
rule Tr  if and only if it is stable. 
(ii) A sequence of coalitions 1 1,T Tr T r TK K− − is generalised stable if and only if  
Tr TK  is generalised stable,  
and for all 1Ti K −∈  
 
11 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )T TT r T T r T T T T w Ti i i i i iV K V K V K V K
−
− − −
−
+ ≥ + ɶ , (2) 
and for all 1Tj N \ K −∈  
 
11 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )T TT T T r T T s T T w Tj j j j j jV K V K V K V K
−
− − − −
++ > + ɶ . (3) 
 (iii) For longer sequences conditions for generalised stability can be established by 
working backwards from (2) and (3). Let tiW  be the worst generally stable coalition 
sequence for player i.   
A sequence of coalitions of length 1T t− + , i.e. ,...,
t T
r t r TK K , is generalised stable 
if the subsequence of length  T t− , i.e. 
1 1
,...,
t T
r t r TK K
+ +
,  is generalised stable and 
if for all ti K∈  
 
1
1
( ) ( ) ( )t
T
t r t r t t t
i i i i i
t
V K V K V K W
ττ τ +
−
τ= +
+ ≥ +∑ ,  
and for all tj N \ K∈  
 
1
1
( ) ( ) ( )t
T
t t r t s t t
j j j j j
t
V K V K V K W
ττ τ +
+
τ= +
+ > +∑ . 
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DEFINITION 3  (i) In the last period, coalition TK  is Pareto perfect under sharing rule 
Tr  if and only if it is stable and Pareto undominated by any other stable coalition. 
(ii) A sequence of coalitions ,...,t Tr t r TK K  is Pareto perfect if and only if  
it is generalised stable and Pareto undominated by any other generalised stable 
sequence stretching from t to T 
 and all its subsequences 
1 1
,...,
t T
r t r TK K
−
−
, 
2 2
,...,
t T
r t r TK K
−
−
, …,
T
r TK  are 
generalised stable and Pareto undominated.    
In the remainder of the paper we confine the analysis to a two-period game, 2T = . To extend 
the analysis to more periods is straightforward, based on Definitions 2 and 3, but tedious.    
For 2T = ,  2 2( )wi iV Kɶ  is the worst credible punishment that can be imposed on i in period 2. 
Condition (2) requires of a Pareto perfect equilibrium 1 21 2,r rK K  that the payoff of a period-
1 coalition member (left hand side) is at least as large as the payoff from defecting from 
coalition 1K  (right hand side). It is a credible threat that 2w iKɶ  will be played as it is a Pareto 
perfect subgame.  Condition (3) requires that a singleton player in period 1 receives at least as 
much as when entering coalition 1K . Conditions (2) and (3) are generalisations of the notions 
of internal and external stability, respectively. In what follows we will sometimes say 
“coalition 1K  is generalised stable” in place of the correct but lengthy phrase “coalition 1K  is 
part of a generalised stable sequence of coalitions”. This just means that no member of 1K  has 
an incentive to leave and no non-member has an incentive to join.  
Using definition 2 we can now establish a condition to determine whether for a given 
sequence of partition functions we can find valuations (or sharing rules) such that a sequence 
of coalitions is Pareto perfect. For simplicity we restrict the exposition to a time invariant 
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partition function. Again, generalisations are straightforward but involve more tedious 
notation.4 
First, we focus on generalised internal stability. From condition (2) we can see that a coalition 
1K  can only be part of a generalised stable sequence if each member of 1K  receives at least 
its defection payoff  
1 1 2( ) ( ) ( )wi i i i iD K V K V K−≡ + ɶ .  
Therefore, a necessary condition for  generalised internal stability of 1K  is that the sum of 
payoffs of the coalition members is at least as large as the sum of their defection payoffs:  
 ( )1 2
1 1
1 2 1( ) ( ) ( )r ri i i
i K i K
V K V K D K
∈ ∈
+ ≥∑ ∑ . (4) 
The generalised stability of 1K  depends upon defection payoffs of the members of 1K  and the 
sharing rule 2r  applied in period 2; the latter only if there is some 1 2i K K∈ ∩ . The defection 
payoff is further specified by the partition function that determines the payoffs of the singleton 
players and, hence, the period-1 outside option payoff of 1i K∈ , i.e. 1( )i iV K−  is independent of 
sharing. If player 1i K∈  defects, then her period-2 payoff is 2( )wi iV Kɶ . If the player is 
singleton, i.e. 2ii K∉ ɶ , the payoff is independent of the sharing rule w. If 
2
ii K∈ ɶ , then sharing 
rule w applies and i receives the worst possible payoff compatible with Pareto perfection of 
2w
iKɶ . 
The next step in our argument is to determine how sharing in coalitions 1K  and 2K  can be 
arranged such that condition (4) is met in all cases where this is possible for a given partition 
function.  To achieve this, the sharing rule 2r  applied to 2K  should distribute the coalition 
                                                 
4
 Note that the partition function we use in sections 3 and 4 is not time-invariant. 
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surplus 2KS  entirely to members of 
1 2K K∩ , leaving members of 2K  that are not members 
of 1K  with their outside option payoff. Intuitively this rewards coalition members of the first 
period and lowers their incentive for defection. Hence, by construction we have the following: 
PROPOSITION 1: (i) Consider a Pareto perfect period-2 coalition 2K . Suppose sharing in 
period 2 is arranged such that 
2
2
1 2
2( )ri K
i K K
V K S
∈ ∩
=∑ . Then, if for such 2K  and 2r  
condition (4) is not met, then 1 21 2,r rK K  is not generalised internally stable and 
cannot be a Pareto perfect equilibrium for any sequence of sharing rules 1 2r ,r .  
(ii) Again, let 2K  be Pareto perfect. Suppose sharing in period 2 is arranged as stated 
under (i). Then, if for such 2K  and 2r  condition (4) is met for 1K , then there exists a 
sharing rule 1*r  such that 
1* 21 2
,
r rK K  is generalised internally stable. 
Proof: We do not work out a formal proof. Part (i) follows from the construction of S. Part (ii) 
follows from the fact that in (4) the period-1 coalition payoff 1
1
1( )ri
i K
V K
∈
∑  is independent of 
1r  and from the fact that there is no restriction on 1r . Hence, as long as (4) holds, the period-1 
coalition payoff 1KV can always be distributed in a way to meet the generalised internal 
stability condition (2) for each and every 1i K∈ . ■           
Proposition 1 allows us to identify all coalitions that can be generalised stable for a given 
partition function. We call a sharing rule that satisfies (2) for all 1i K∈  whenever (4) is 
satisfied an “optimal sharing rule”. Optimal sharing requires that 1*r  is chosen such that 
1* 21 1 2( ) ( ) ( )r ri i iV K D K V K≥ −  for all 1i K∈ .    
Next, we turn to external stability. The following proposition establishes that external 
stability, condition (3), is of little concern when an optimal sharing rule is applied.  
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PROPOSITION 2: Consider a Pareto perfect period-2 equilibrium 
2 2r K . If 1K  is 
generalised externally unstable under an optimal sharing rule 1r  (applied to 1 jK+ )  such 
that there exists 1j K∉  and  such that 2 11 2 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )r r wj j j j j jV K V K V K V K++ ≤ + ɶ , 
meaning that j prefers to enter coalition 1K  under sharing rule 1r , then the enlarged 
coalition 
1 1r
jK+  will be generalised internally (and the equilibrium played in the 
continuation game is 
2 2r K ).   
  Proof: By assumption 1 21 2 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )r w rj j j j j jV K V K V K V K+ + ≥ +ɶ . By definition. 
22 2( ) ( )w rj j jV K V K≤ɶ . Hence, we have 
1 21 2 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )r r wj j j j j jV K V K V K V K+ + ≥ + ɶ  which is 
what, according to (2), generalised internal stability of 1 jK+  requires. Furthermore, 1r  is an 
optimal sharing rule, if (2) applies to j, then it applies to all 1 1r ji K+∈ .  ■  
Propositions 1 and 2 allow us to identify the largest (or most successful) Pareto perfect 
coalitions in a coalition formation game for the provision public goods. To this we turn now. 
As a model with heterogeneous players does not readily yield general analytical results, we 
resort to numerical simulations. 
3 Numerical model and data 
This section and the next provide an application. We identify the best Pareto perfect equilibria 
in a greenhouse gas abatement game, that is we identify a sequence of international climate 
agreements that is generalised stable and that achieves a higher global payoff than other 
generalised stable agreements. The stage game we consider is standard in this domain (cf. e.g. 
Carraro and Siniscalco 1993, Barrett 1994, Botteon and Carraro 1997, Rubio and Ulph 2007). 
It consists of an announcement game followed by an abatement game. We explore this game 
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as a one-shot game (i.e. with one commitment period) and with one round of renegotiations 
(i.e. with two commitment periods). Formally the stage game is characterised by a set of 
regions {1,2,..., }N n= . At the beginning of commitment period t ( 1,2t = ) each player i 
chooses from a strategy set {0,1}tiσ ∈ ; 0tiσ =  means that i is not joining the ICA in period t; 
1tiσ =  means that i joins the ICA in period t. As before, we denote by tK N⊆  the set of 
coalition members (signatories) in commitment period t. Now consider a given coalition tK . 
Chander and Tulkens (1995) call this a ‘partial agreement’. In the period-t abatement game 
members of tK  act like a single player and maximise their joint payoff. They adopt GHG 
abatement paths which are jointly optimal responses to others' abatement paths. Other players, 
the singletons, maximise individual payoffs. They adopt abatement paths which are optimal 
responses to others' emissions. Generally we denote i's GHG abatement path in period t by tiq . 
The period-t Nash equilibrium abatement strategy is denoted by * ( )t tiq K . The abatement 
game described generates a partition function that gives payoffs for the coalition and the 
singletons for every coalition that may form.5 Generally, each player receives benefits bi from 
total abatement t tii Nq q∈=∑  and incurs costs ci for own abatement 
t
iq . A singleton player 
under coalition tK  receives 
 
* *( ) ( ( )) ( ( ))t t t t t t t ti i i iV K b q K c q K= − , for all \ ti N K∈ . (5) 
The coalition payoff is given by 
 ( )* *( ) ( ( )) ( ( ))t
t
t t t t t t t t
i i iK
i K
V K b q K c q K
∈
= −∑ .      (6) 
                                                 
5
 One qualification is needed. The partial agreement abatement game generates a partition function only if it has 
unique solution. This condition is satisfied in the empirical setting of the STACO model. 
 15 
The partition function on which the stability analysis is based arises from the abatement game 
characterised by (5) and (6).  
To further specify the model, we adopt the STACO-model introduced by Finus et al. (2006) 
and refined by Nagashima et al. (2006) and Weikard, Dellink and Van Ierland (2006). Here, 
we focus on the main features of the model. We consider twelve world regions; USA (USA), 
Japan (JPN), European Union-15 (EU15), other OECD countries (OOE), Eastern European 
countries (EET), former Soviet Union (FSU), energy exporting countries (EEX), China 
(CHN), India (IND), dynamic Asian economies (DAE), Brazil (BRA) and rest of the world 
(ROW). We account for benefits from abatement to infinity, but adopt a shorter planning 
horizon of 100 years, ranging from 2011 to 2110, for determining abatement paths. In this 
setting the intertemporal aspects of climate change are well reflected. Benefits from abatement 
are avoided damages which, in turn, depend on stock of CO2; each region receives a share of 
global benefits. As described in Dellink et al. (2004), marginal benefits can be assumed to be 
constant. Marginal abatement costs are assumed to be a quadratic function of the region’s own 
abatement level. The assumption of linear benefits implies that regions have dominant 
strategies; the optimal response functions do neither depend on the actions of other players, 
nor on the stock of greenhouse gases. We calibrate the model as far as possible (regional 
emission and GDP paths, regional abatement costs) on the MIT-EPPA model (Babiker et al. 
2001 and Ellerman and Decaux 1998), but as this model dos not contain a damage cost 
module, we have to rely on other sources (mainly Nordhaus and Boyer 2001 and Tol 1997) for 
calibrating the benefits from abatement; see Dellink et al. (2004) and Nagashima et al. (2006) 
for more details. 
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4 Results and discussion 
This section presents the results of coalition formation for the STACO game with one 
commitment period (4.1) and two commitment periods (4.2). 
4.1 Optimal sharing in the one-shot game 
In the one-shot game, coalition members commit to abatement and transfer paths for the full 
planning period of 100 years. We find 108 stable and Pareto undominated coalitions. In Table 
1 we present net present values (NPVs) and resulting CO2 concentrations for the benchmark 
cases (All-Singletons and Grand Coalition) and for the best performing stable coalitions.  
With asymmetric players, as in our setting, global payoff does not just depend on the number 
of players in the coalition but also on their characteristics. For instance, coalitions where 
China is a member will generally implement higher abatement levels than coalitions where 
China is not involved. As China’s marginal abatement costs are very low compared to other 
regions, the efficient division of abatement efforts will involve a substantial contribution of 
China. In fact, China appears as member in all ten best-performing coalitions. Of course, 
China’s involvement in a coalition requires sufficient availability of transfers – else China 
would prefer to take a free-rider position. We find China in 50 out of 108 stable coalitions. 
Table 2 provides more detailed information for the non-cooperative (“All-Singletons”) case, 
which is dominated, and for the best performing stable coalition. We report abatement levels 
and payoffs for individual regions. As a reference, abatement in 2011 and discounted payoffs 
are reported. The best performing coalition consists of the USA, Central and Eastern 
European Countries in Transition (EET), China, India and the Dynamic Asian Economies 
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(DAE). All regions are better off under partial cooperation than in the non-cooperative 
situation, showing that the gains from cooperation are substantial. 
 
Table 1. Best performing stable coalitions – one-shot game 
Coalition members NPV of payoff 
[Billion US$] 
Concentrations 
2110 [Gton] 
All-Singletons* 5238 680 
Grand Coalition* 15211 612 
USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE 9830 659 
EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, IND 9810 659 
EU15, OOE, EET, CHN, IND 9701 659 
EU15, EET, CHN, IND, DAE 9697 659 
USA, EET, EEX, CHN, DAE, BRA 9613 660 
EU15, OOE, EET, EEX, CHN, BRA 9486 660 
USA, CHN, IND, DAE, BRA 9484 660 
EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, DAE, BRA 9484 660 
USA, OOE, EET, EEX, CHN 9469 660 
EU15, EEX, CHN, IND, BRA 9455 660 
* All-Singletons and Grand Coalition are not stable. 
 
Table 2. Key results for selected coalitions – one-shot game* 
 All-Singletons 
Coalition of  
USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE 
 
Abatement in 
2011 
[% of BaU 
emissions] 
NPV of payoff 
[Billion US$] 
Abatement in 
2011 
[% of BaU 
emissions] 
NPV of payoff 
[Billion US$] 
NPV of 
transfer 
[Billion US$] 
Incentive to 
change signal 
(NPV) 
[Billion US$] 
USA 9.9 1117 13.2 1603 -663 -9 
JPN 2.5 943 2.5 1933 0 -207 
EU15 7.6 1240 7.6 2595 0 -274 
OOE 5.6 188 5.6 386 0 -19 
EET 4.4 71 28.7 138 64 -1 
FSU 6.7 362 6.7 749 0 -59 
EEX 1.9 164 1.9 336 0 -15 
CHN 14.8 298 50.1 415 452 -2 
IND 10.5 268 37.8 485 83 -3 
DAE 1.9 136 18.1 261 64 -1 
BRA 0.1 84 0.1 172 0 -4 
ROW 6.3 365 6.3 755 0 -60 
Global 8.0 5238 16.9 9830 0 -654 
* Bold numbers indicate membership. 
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The member with the highest marginal benefits from abatement in the best performing 
equilibrium is the USA; thus, the transfer scheme involves a payment from the USA to the 
other regions, as shown in Table 2. The low marginal abatement costs in China induce a huge 
abatement effort in China and the associated costs are largely funded by the transfer scheme. 
The main beneficiaries from this coalition are the two outsiders: Japan and the European 
Union benefit much from the coalition’s increased abatement, compared to the All-Singletons 
case. They do not increase their abatement efforts, however. This reflects the public good 
characteristic of abatement. Thus, their incentive to join the coalition (to change membership) 
is large and negative. 
4.2 Optimal sharing in the renegotiation game 
Renegotiations after 50 years  
As discussed in the introduction, renegotiations may influence the outcome as players can 
change their membership decision. Introducing a round of renegotiations after 50 years may 
induce larger coalitions in the first stage, as non-cooperative behaviour may be punished by 
playing a worse equilibrium in the second stage. 
As Table 3 shows, there are multiple equilibria in the second stage. This opens possibilities 
for punishment and brings about a huge number of equilibria in the first stage. Table 3 reports 
NPVs of payoffs for the 10 best performing Pareto perfect coalition sequences (PPCs). The 
table offers a number of interesting observations. 
First, although the second stage of the game has a shorter time horizon than the one-shot 
game, the best performing equilibria are largely the same. The best performing generalised 
stable coalitions in the first stage are, however, more ambitious. Where in the one-shot game 
46% of the potential gain from cooperation may be reaped, the two-stage game can close the 
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gap between All-Singletons and the Grand Coalition by 57%. The combination of 
renegotiations and a scheme of optimal transfers makes a significant difference. In 
comparison, a two-stage game with an exogenous transfer rule can only reap 25% of the 
potential gain (cf. Weikard, Dellink and Van Ierland 2006). 
Secondly, the three best performing PPCs (and many other PPCs) contain one of the three 
high damage regions (USA, Japan or EU15) in the first stage but another high damage region 
in the second stage. As these regions have strong free rider incentives in the second stage 
coalition, they can “persuade” another region to join the coalition in the first stage, i.e. free-
riding in both stages has become more difficult due to the possibility of punishment.  
Thirdly, the bonus that permanent members receive induces that many coalition members 
from the second stage are also present in the first stage: EET, China and India are present in 
all 10 best performing PPCs at both stages. For the regions with high marginal benefits, this 
bonus is not always sufficient to compensate for the large free-rider incentives and the high 
transfers that they have to pay when joining a coalition. Thus, we find that especially the 
OECD regions are just temporary members of a climate coalition. 
Table 3. Best performing stable coalitions – renegotiations after 50 years 
Coalition members NPV of payoff [billion US$] 
1st stage 2nd stage 1st st. 2nd st. Total 
JPN, OOE, EET, FSU, CHN, IND, DAE, ROW USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE 6528 4409 10937 
JPN, OOE, EET, FSU, CHN, IND, DAE, ROW EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, IND 6528 4402 10930 
EU15, EET, FSU, CHN, IND, DAE, ROW USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE 6511 4409 10920 
EU15, EET, FSU, CHN, IND, DAE, ROW EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, IND 6511 4402 10912 
JPN, OOE, EET, FSU, CHN, IND, DAE, ROW EU15, EET, CHN, IND, DAE 6528 4352 10880 
USA, OOE, EET, EEX, CHN, IND, ROW USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE 6469 4409 10878 
JPN, OOE, EET, FSU, CHN, IND, DAE, ROW EU15, OOE, EET, CHN, IND 6528 4346 10874 
USA, EET, EEX, CHN, IND, DAE, ROW USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE 6463 4409 10872 
USA, OOE, EET, EEX, CHN, IND, ROW EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, IND 6469 4402 10871 
USA, OOE, EET, FSU, EEX, CHN, IND USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE 6458 4409 10868 
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Table 4 gives the main regional results for the best performing sequence of coalitions. As 
there are no punishments in the second (last) stage by definition, the equilibria in this stage are 
not only self-enforcing, but also individually beneficial: all players are worse off when they 
leave the coalition, though the differences are sometimes small. This can be seen from the 
negative incentives to change membership in the second stage. Note also that the USA, as the 
only non-permanent member in the second stage, only receives its outside option payoff (the 
permanent members divide the surplus), and thus its incentive to change membership in this 
stage is exactly zero. 
The punishment options are clearly visible in the incentives to change membership for the 
coalition members in the first stage. All temporary coalition members would be better off if 
they could free-ride and leave the coalition. Their decision is, however, not based on a simple 
comparison of net benefits within the first stage, but on their net benefits over the full century. 
As free-riding would be punished in the second stage and the punishments are sufficiently 
severe, it is possible to enforce cooperation in the first stage. For the permanent members, the 
situation is different: they can also be threatened into cooperation (i.e. the “stick” can be 
used), but they benefit from the “carrot”: they divide the surplus that is generated in both 
stages among themselves. 
As in the one-shot game, the non-participating OECD regions, in this case USA in the first 
stage and EU15 in both stages, benefit strongly from the coalition that is formed, as their 
climate damages are substantially reduced, while their own abatement costs are moderate.  
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Table 4. Key results for the coalition of {JPN, OOE, EET, FSU, CHN, IND, DAE, ROW} and 
{USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE} in the first and second phase, respectively – renegotiations 
after 50 years* 
 Abatement NPV of payoff NPV of  transfer 
Incentive to change 
signal (NPV) 
 
2011 2061 
1st com-
mitment 
period 
2nd com-
mitment 
period 
1st com-
mitment 
period 
2nd com-
mitment 
period 
1st com-
mitment 
period 
2nd com-
mitment 
period 
 
(% of BaU 
emissions) 
(% of BaU 
emissions) 
Billion 
US$ 
Billion 
US$ 
Billion 
US$ 
Billion 
US$ 
Billion 
US$ 
Billion 
US$ 
USA 9.9 8.7 1701 722 0 -295 -266.2 0.0 
JPN 6.5 2.6 657 865 -668 0 436.1 -90.7 
EU15 7.6 5.7 1817 1161 0 0 -273.3 -120.2 
OOE 21.0 2.9 164 173 -47 0 87.2 -8.4 
EET 33.0 17.3 122 62 80 28 -25.3 -0.7 
FSU 18.4 5.0 291 336 -126 0 170.6 -25.9 
EEX 1.9 1.7 235 150 0 0 -31.0 -6.7 
CHN 59.0 26.8 447 188 583 200 -149.9 -2.3 
IND 44.2 16.9 450 219 194 38 -107.4 -2.6 
DAE 21.8 13.0 233 117 108 29 -50.4 -1.4 
BRA 0.1 0.1 120 77 0 0 -18.4 -1.6 
ROW 20.8 4.4 293 338 -125 0 171.9 -26.2 
Global   6528 4409 0 0   
* Bold numbers indicate membership.  
 
The pattern of transfers across coalition members is largely conform expectations: the regions 
with large marginal benefits benefit from the high abatement levels in the regions with low 
marginal abatement costs and co-finance these high abatement levels. Furthermore, permanent 
members appropriate the entire surplus generated by the coalition, and thus transfers tend to 
go from temporary members to permanent members. Coalitional maximisation requires that 
marginal abatement costs are equal across coalition members and equal to the sum of marginal 
benefits of all coalition members. For singletons, marginal abatement costs equal their own 
marginal benefits. 
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Optimal renegotiation time 
Earlier renegotiations may induce even larger coalitions in the first stage, as second stage 
payoffs are large compared to first stage payoffs. Thus, the threats that can be imposed on 
regions in the first stage are relatively large. As it is likely that the first stage generalised 
stable coalitions are more ambitious than the stable coalitions in the second stage (see also 
Weikard, Dellink and Van Ierland, 2006) and the first stage is now relatively short, this may 
not increase the performance of the resulting equilibria over the century. It may, however, 
boost cooperation in the first stage. While earlier renegotiations thus increase threats that help 
to stabilise larger coalitions, later renegotiations maintain the benefits of a larger coalition for 
longer. As these two mechanisms counteract each other, there is an optimal renegotiation 
moment where the additional benefit from high ambition balances with prolonged ambition in 
the first phase. 
We find that the moment of renegotiation only affects the equilibria that emerge in the first 
commitment period, as shown in Table 5. Stability in the second commitment period is robust 
with respect to the length of the period. In the first commitment period, however, the 
possibilities for credible punishment are crucial in the stabilisation of more ambitious 
coalitions: the later the renegotiations, the weaker the threats and hence the less ambitious the 
best performing PPCs.   
 23 
Table 5. Key results for different moments of renegotiations 
 Best performing RPC 
Renegotiations 
after ... years Members 1st commitment period 
Members 2nd commitment 
period 
NPV of 
payoff 
Concentra-
tions 2110 
10 USA, JPN, EU15, OOE, EET, FSU, 
EEX, CHN, IND, DAE, BRA, ROW 
USA, EET, CHN, IND, 
DAE 
10451 657 
20 USA, JPN, EU15, OOE, EET, FSU, 
EEX, CHN, IND, DAE, BRA, ROW 
USA, EET, CHN, IND, 
DAE 
11073 654 
30 USA, JPN, OOE, EET, FSU, EEX, 
CHN, IND, DAE, BRA, ROW 
USA, EET, CHN, IND, 
DAE 
11431 654 
40 USA, EET, FSU, EEX, CHN, IND, 
DAE, BRA, ROW 
USA, EET, CHN, IND, 
DAE 
11238 655 
50 JPN, OOE, EET, FSU, CHN, IND, 
DAE, ROW 
USA, EET, CHN, IND, 
DAE 
10937 655 
60 USA, EET, EEX, CHN, IND, ROW USA, EET, CHN, IND, 
DAE 
10647 656 
70 USA, OOE, EET, EEX, CHN, IND USA, EET, CHN, IND, 
DAE 
10397 657 
80 EU15, EET, CHN, IND, ROW USA, EET, CHN, IND, 
DAE 
10096 657 
90 USA, EET, EEX, CHN, IND USA, EET, CHN, IND, 
DAE 
9938 658 
When the renegotiation moment is sufficiently early, the Grand Coalition can be stabilised in 
the first commitment period. In fact, most large coalitions are generalised stable when 
renegotiations are held after 10 or 20 years, including the 11-player coalitions where Brazil or 
Japan free-ride. The intuition behind this result is that these two regions have very steep 
marginal abatement cost curves. Their participation in the coalition requires that even though 
they are temporary members and will not get more than their outside-option payoff, a 
substantial share of the surplus generated by the coalition would go to these regions to 
compensate their high abatement costs. But their participation would hardly benefit other 
regions, as their abatement levels would remain relatively small. 
Because the larger stable coalitions exist for a shorter first commitment period, they do not 
contribute very much to the payoff over the entire planning horizon. Although the Grand 
Coalition is stabilised when renegotiations are held after 20 years, only 59% of the total 
potential gains of cooperation are reaped (100% in the first stage, 46% in the second stage).  
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The best moment to renegotiate, in terms of maximising payoff of the best performing RPC, is 
after 30 years: this balances a sufficiently long first commitment period to enable prolonged 
strong abatement policies with sufficiently high threats to ensure stability of this ambitious 
coalition in the first commitment period. In this case, 62% of the potential gains of 
cooperation are reaped. By contrast, the worst renegotiation moment is after 90 years, where 
only 47% of the potential gains may be reaped – hardly better than what can be achieved in 
the one-shot game.  
Table 6. Key results for the coalition of {USA, JPN, OOE, EET, FSU, EEX, CHN, IND, DAE, 
BRA, ROW} and {USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE} in the first and second phase, respectively – 
renegotiations after 30 years 
 Abatement NPV of payoff NPV of  transfer 
Incentive to change 
signal (NPV) 
 
2011 2041 
1st com-
mitment 
period 
2nd com-
mitment 
period 
1st com-
mitment 
period 
2nd com-
mitment 
period 
1st com-
mitment 
period 
2nd com-
mitment 
period 
 
(% of BaU 
emissions) 
(% of BaU 
emissions) 
Billion 
US$ 
Billion 
US$ 
Billion 
US$ 
Billion 
US$ 
Billion 
US$ 
Billion 
US$ 
USA 19.7 10.6 1570 1071 323 -434 -425.9 -5.9 
JPN 9.4 2.8 353 1282 -779 0 650.2 -135.5 
EU15 7.6 6.5 1577 1721 0 0 -291.5 -179.3 
OOE 26.1 3.8 90 256 -73 0 130.0 -12.5 
EET 41.4 20.7 76 92 60 41 8.0 -0.5 
FSU 22.9 5.3 153 497 -170 0 254.4 -38.7 
EEX 23.9 1.8 76 223 -22 0 113.1 -10.0 
CHN 76.5 30.6 359 277 688 296 -94.0 -1.5 
IND 56.6 21.3 303 322 128 54 -1.9 -1.8 
DAE 29.2 15.1 148 173 65 42 11.2 -1.0 
BRA 5.1 0.1 44 114 -52 0 57.7 -2.4 
ROW 26.5 4.9 154 501 -168 0 256.3 -39.2 
Global   4902 6529 0 0   
* Bold numbers indicate membership.  
 
The regional results of the overall best performing PPCs are presented in Table 6. The most 
striking result is that all signatories that are not remaining in the coalition in the second stage 
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have an incentive to leave the coalition in the first stage, if they would not be punished in the 
second stage. For some regions, abatement levels are very large in the first stage, especially 
for China and India. In the absence of transfers, China would lose more than 300 billion US$ 
on their own abatement efforts.6 Clearly, they need to be compensated for this with substantial 
transfers. Japan is willing to provide these transfers, as its benefits from global abatement are 
very high. The USA has a prominent position in this equilibrium: they benefit from the large 
credible threats that enforce an ambitious coalition in the first stage, and they benefit from the 
division of surplus among permanent members. In absolute terms (NPV of payoff), they are 
the main beneficiary of the agreement, together with the European Union (EU15), who benefit 
from free riding.  
Figure 1 shows annual global abatement percentages for the best performing PPC of the 
different specifications and, for comparison, for the All-Singletons case. In all cases, 
abatement percentages are falling for the first 7 decades, but increase slightly thereafter. The 
falling percentages are caused by increases in baseline emission levels that have a bigger 
impact than the increased abatement levels induced by technological progress. The slowdown 
of emission growth in the later decades causes abatement percentages to slightly increase 
towards the end of the century (cf. Nagashima et al. 2005). The figure clearly shows the trade-
off between ambition level and duration of the first commitment period, and also shows that 
the optimal transfer scheme is able to induce substantially higher abatement levels throughout 
the century than when no agreement is signed. 
                                                 
6
 This can be seen in the table as the payoff minus the transfers received. 
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Figure 1. Global emission reductions in percentages for the All-Singletons case and the best 
performing PPCs in the different simulations 
Conclusion 
Although our analysis employs a cautious equilibrium concept – we assume that a region 
would defect from a coalition if its free-rider payoff is larger than its payoff in the coalition – , 
we find equilibria with a large degree of cooperation. Our findings are in contrast to many 
other studies that find only small stable coalitions consisting of no more than two or three 
players; see e.g. the Barrett’s (1994) theoretical analysis and the analysis of Finus et al. (2006) 
using the STACO model. There are three main drivers of our results. First, a well-designed 
transfer scheme is a useful tool to stabilise larger coalitions, as in our setting players differ in 
marginal benefits and marginal cost. Second, the transfer scheme that we suggest is 
specifically designed to increase the incentives to join the coalition. With such optimal 
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transfers internal stability can be achieved for the largest possible set of coalitions. Third, we 
introduce renegotiations. A later commitment period can be used to threaten potential free-
riders into cooperation. Together, these sticks and carrots provide substantial incentives to 
stabilise more successful international climate coalitions. 
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